Date: Friday, 14 June 2024, at 12:30pm (Paris) and 6:30pm (Singapore)

Dual format: ESSEC Paris La Défense (CNIT), Room TBA
and via Zoom, please click here

Conventional evaluation-based voting methods (such as majority judgment or approval voting) can be unified. The idea is to represent a voter's ratings by a point in [0;1]^d, where d is the number of candidates. The winner of the election is then the candidate preferred by the “most central” point in the cloud of voters' ratings. This most central (or deepest) point can be obtained as the one maximizing a given depth function, each depth function thus being associated with a voting method. Voting processes formed in this way escape Arrow's impossibility theorem and possess desirable properties.

Kind regards,
Jeremy Heng, Olga Klopp, Roberto Reno, and Marie Kratz
https://crear.essec.edu/crear-events/working-group-on-risk/meetings-2023-2024
and Riada Djebbar (Singapore Actuarial Society - ERM)